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ABSTRACT
Significant advances have been made recently in
applying probabilistic methods to aerospace vehicle
concepts.  Given the explosive changes that are
occurring in today’s political, social, and technological
climate, it makes practical sense to try and extrapolate
these methods to the campaign analysis level.  This
would allow the assessment of rapidly changing threat
environments as well as technological advancements,
aiding today’s decision makers.  The following paper
summarizes attempts to apply these methods directly to
campaign analysis, and discusses the resulting issues
that were identified as potential problem areas.  A new
approach is postulated which includes the application of
probabilistic methods to a fully linked analysis
environment.  Applying and validating these new
methods is an ongoing project.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the world has been changing at a
remarkable pace.  A revolutionary new economy has
risen.  This economy is based on knowledge rather than
conventional raw materials and physical labor [1].  With
this new economy comes new emphasis on technology
and its impact, especially in the warfighting environment.
Almost all of the world’s countries spend a significant
amount of their budget on the research, development
and procurement of increasingly sophisticated weapons
and warfare technologies [2].  This is necessary because
countries need to maintain or enhance their military
capabilities in order to maintain their supremacy over
their adversaries.  In addition, strong and capable military
capabilities serve as a deterrent to other countries who
might otherwise turn aggressive.  However, the high cost
of maintaining these capabilities must be balanced
against limited resources.  Former U.S. Secretary of
State Dick Cheney is credited with the statement “budget
drives strategy, strategy doesn’t drive budget” [1].
Military decision makers need to understand and assess
the benefits and consequences of their decisions in order
to make cost efficient, timely, and successful choices.
Along with changes in the world’s economy come
changes in the way war is fought.  Substantial progress
has been made in both weapon lethality and military
technology.  In addition, the battlefield of today has
become increasingly complex, with interactions and their
consequences becoming more and more difficult to
isolate and understand.  Because of the rapid advance of
these developments, the decision makers are often left
with ambiguous information and relatively short time
spans to conduct analysis.  Often, these changes occur
so rapidly that previous analysis is rendered obsolete.
For example, an aircraft that is designed to incorporate a
certain avionics suite will often find that those avionics
are obsolete by the time the aircraft comes into
production.  The inherent uncertainty in this information
makes definitive analysis difficult and implies that the use
of probabilistic methods to understand and interpret this
information is most appropriate.
Understanding the sources of the uncertainty helps
determine why a probabilistic approach is useful.  Perfect
knowledge about model inputs is rare, and it is often that
the analyst or decision maker must make assumptions
based on available data and personal experience.  Using
probabilistic inputs would allow the user to account for
variation in his assumptions.  Analysis based on these
probabilistic inputs could provide useful information about
the sensitivities of the inputs, which in turn could be
translated into requirements definitions.  By allowing the
inputs to vary, the analyst or decision maker could play
“what if” games, using the models as a computationally
and economically inexpensive way to explore the
boundaries of the problem.  And finally, variable inputs
would allow an investigation of the robustness of a
solution (i.e. that solution whose performance
parameters are invariant or relatively invariant to
changes in its environment).
Another major source of uncertainty can be found when
considering the incorporation of a new technology.
Modeling current technologies is straightforward, with the
performance parameters of that technology generally
known.  However, current technologies may not be
capable of meeting customer needs or design goals.  In
addition, current technology may be obsolete by the time
the system is implemented.  This necessitates a
prediction capability concerning the impact of new
technologies.  Performance of a new technology is a
function of its readiness level, but that function may or
may not be completely defined.  By modeling a new
technology in a probabilistic fashion, one can explore
various assumptions pertaining to the performance and
the corresponding effects of that technology.
Overall, the presence of uncertainty in most complex
systems, including campaign analysis, makes the use of
probabilistic methods  a valuable analysis tool for today’s
military decision makers.
MODELS AND MODELING
In order to understand the role of probabilistics in
campaign analysis, it is important to understand the
nature of military modeling.  A model can be defined as a
purposeful abstraction of a more complex reality [3,4].
This reality could take the form of a real or imagined
system, an idea, or a phenomenon or activity.  The
model tries to capture the essence of this reality in a
simplified representation.  A military model is specifically
defined as “a representation of a military operation and is
an abstraction of reality to assist in making defense-
related decisions” [3].
Rather than being physical (iconic), most military models
in use today are abstract, or mathematical, models.  This
kind of model uses symbols and logic to create an
abstraction of reality.  Mathematical relationships are
often utilized to represent the dynamic properties of the
object.  Examples of an abstract model include an aircraft
sizing and synthesis code, a biologic model that mimics
population growth of bacteria, or an economic model of
the stock market.
Abstract models are further divided into descriptive and
prescriptive [3,5].  A descriptive model limits itself to
replicating the behavior of what it is representing.  As
such, there is no value judgement placed on the
behavior; no “goodness” or “badness” is represented.  An
example of a descriptive model is a combat simulation.
Decisions based on information from descriptive models
are made by inference, as there is no integral
optimization structure inherent in the model.  For
example, a sizing and synthesis code, which is another
example of a descriptive code, may indicate that an
aircraft’s gross weight is 35,000 pounds, but the model
itself does not specify whether this is an acceptable value
or not.
In contrast, a prescriptive model specifies a course of
action, with an attached value judgement.  A prescriptive
model (sometimes called normative, which implies a
representation of human behavior) may label an output
as adequate, inadequate, or optimal.  Linear
programming, dynamic programming, game theory, and
decision theory are all methodologies that indicate to
their user an acceptable course of action.  It is often
difficult to separate a descriptive model from a
prescriptive one.  Descriptive models are often used
prescriptively, to explore options and solutions by trial
and error.  Prescriptive models are often used for insight
only, as some loss of fidelity is usually traded off in order
to incorporate optimization schemes.  The user of such
models needs to understand the abilities and limitations
of each model in order to utilize them accurately and
effectively.
HIERARCHICAL MODELING - In addition to classifying
military models according to their traits and
characteristics, it is important to understand how these
models relate to each other, and what their specific
function is.  A well known way of relating military models
is to classify them as to their position in a defined
hierarchy.  This hierarchy is often portrayed as having a
pyramidal shape (Figure 1) and is described by Hughes
[3]: “Whatever the number of echelons that is included in
it, the bottom will contain mainly phenomenological
models and the top a single macro model.  The pyramid
may represent the nesting of models in one interacting,
organic whole; show how results are integrated from
echelon to echelon; or merely be an abstract
representation of a structure that relates independent
model operations.”
Typically, a hierarchical structure will be divided up into
three or four aggregate levels.  Ziegler [6] first introduced
the idea of decomposing models in a hierarchical manner
that corresponded to levels of detail.  Later, he described
this decomposition as having as its first level the most
abstract behavioral description of the system.  This is
followed by sub-systems levels of increasing detail, until
a limit is reached and further decomposition is not
justified [7].  This type of decomposition is echoed in the
hierarchical structures of military models described
today: the first level usually contains an encompassing
theater or campaign level model, followed by
engagement or mission models, with  the lower levels









Figure 1- Traditional Pyramid of Military Models
DECOMPOSITION LEVELS - There are other examples
of hierarchical levels [8,9] that are each different in their
specifics, yet illustrate an interesting point: although each
example chooses its own delineation for its levels, and
names them correspondingly, each individual hierarchy
does encompass the entire spectrum of relational military
models and analysis, starting from a detailed,
engineering type model and ending in an overall systems
level model.  In order to discuss and define these types
of models, they will be divided into roughly three
categories: engineering models, mission models, and
campaign models.  These model categories will now be
discussed in more detail, with the understanding that
they will overlap in definition as they pertain to individual
hierarchies.
Engineering Models - The level that comprises the
bottom of all hierarchies is that of engineering models.
These are usually detailed mathematical representations
of individual systems or components that may or may not
be associated with a platform.  For example, a hierarchy
may consider a jammer or a sensor to be an engineering
model, yet another hierarchy may lump them together
onto a platform and have one model of that integrated
system.  Engineering models are usually physics-based,
contain a high level of detail, and are of relatively short
simulation timeframe.  Inputs are usually design
variables, sizing criteria, and new technologies.  Basic
mission requirements and constraints may be introduced
at this level to aid in sizing.  For example, an aircraft
sizing and synthesis code typically needs a rudimentary
mission profile to be input for sizing purposes.  (An
interesting investigation of the influence of mission
requirements on the vehicle being sized can be found in
[10].)  Outputs of engineering models often consist of
geometric dimensions and performance data.
Engineering codes are generally used to conduct
tradeoff studies of design variables and technologies,
and to calculate performance characteristics.  These
types of codes can usually be validated and they lend
themselves well to real-world testing.  However, analysis
conducted using this type of model is limited to the scope
of the model.  For example, an airplane sizing and
synthesis model can provide data about the performance
of a particular aircraft, yet does not provide information
as to how well that aircraft will aid in reaching system
(theater or campaign) level goals.  Figure 2, from Ref [8],
shows the engineering level features.
Mission Models - The middle level of the traditional
pyramid is occupied by mission models.  These models,
also referred to as engagement models, encapsulate one
vs. one or many vs. many encounters of specific sub-
system components.  For example, a mission level code
could be used to simulate air-to-air combat between
multiple flights of aircraft.  The focus on this level
concerns the timing and details of a single mission.
Scenario, strategy, support, and overall force capabilities
are usually not considered [11].  The timeframe of
mission models is usually at the hours or days level, and
they involve a medium level of detail.  The level of
interaction is increased, and the model will usually
contain aggregate systems and subsystems.  Unlike the
engineering models, mission models are more
troublesome to validate, and data collection for input is
often difficult. Figure 3 shows a representation of the
mission level from Ref [8].
Figure 2- Engineering Level Model Features
Figure 3- Mission Level Model Features
Campaign Models - Campaign models, also called force





            Detailed systems and subsystems
            Some physics-based interactions
 Strengths:
-Amenable to real-world testing
-Generally able to be validated
-Data collection centralized (1 SPO)
 Limitations:
 -Limited scope / context
            Only answers question in a small arena
Engineering/Engagement View of the World
Characteristics:
-Medium simulation timeframe (Hrs - days)
-Up to theater in scope
-Medium detail
          Entity-Based: Simulation entities map to real world entities
          Many interactions effects-based
          Systems & Subsystems aggregated
 Strengths:
Scope: Variety of interactions
Theater sized scenarios
 Limitations:
-Not comparable to real world testing standards
-Not easily validated
-Data collection dispersed
Mission-Level View of the World
that encompass the effects of the total forces involved,
including air, ground, and naval, as well as coalition
forces [11,12].  They are primarily used to answer
questions and make decisions at the larger system level.
For example, campaign analysis, aided by campaign
models, is used to study the interactions of strategy,
force allocation, and system capabilities.  Other features
that dominate analysis are the effects of command and
control decisions, deployment and sustainment (logistics)
issues, and the cumulative effects of decisions as
considered in a time-spanning environment.
There are many campaign (or theater) level models in
use today.  It is common that certain organizations favor
specific codes for their analysis needs, and these codes
often emphasize, in terms of modeling detail and
capability, a particular force.  Some of the more well-
used codes and the organizations that are their primary
users are listed in Figure 4.
Figure 4- Common Campaign Codes in Use Today
There are inherent limitations to campaign models.  The
first is that an inordinate amount of experience and
information is needed by the user to use them effectively:
the quality of the analysis is often directly related to the
experience of the analyst.  In addition, considerable
detail is needed in both the scenario definitions and in
the component descriptions in order to have a complete
analysis.  Yet at the same time, the complexity and run
time of the code necessitates that detail be kept at a
minimum.  Insight into strategic philosophy must also be
considered.  Another problem is the length of the
campaign to be modeled.  As the campaign time
increases, difficulty in retaining fidelity of the model also
increases.  A key feature of campaign time is that as the
campaign progresses, tactics and decisions evolve
based on experiences and results so far [3].  This
“human in the loop” problem is considered in more detail
in subsequent sections.  The campaign level is depicted
by Ref [8] and is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5- Campaign Level Model Features
THE CODE CONTINUUM – Given the features of each
type of military model, the traditional pyramid formulation
can be replaced and enhanced by a new concept, similar
to that in Ref [8], of a military code continuum.  Figure 6
shows this continuum, and illustrates the primary two
analysis tradeoff of the continuum: as analysis moves
from the engineering end of the spectrum to the
campaign analysis end, the modeling codes increase
dramatically in complexity yet lose an enormous amount
of detail.  This is a main reason that probabilistic
methods are considered at the campaign level.  The
sheer number of entities that need to be modeled,
coupled with an increasing number of decisions and
interactions, soon lead to a modeling problem that is so
complex that it becomes impractical to model the inputs
with any level of detail.  However, this necessary
sacrifice of detail does come with a price.  At the
engineering level, where significant detail is captured, the
resulting metrics are very specific.  Questions can be
answered precisely.  As the analysis moves towards the
campaign level, the metrics become increasingly
amorphous, with results that are more subjective and
provide insight rather than explicit answers.
Figure 6- The Military Code Continiumm
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS
PROBABILISTIC METHODS AT THE ENGINEERING
LEVEL – Much work has been done recently using
probabilistic methods at the individual aerospace
concepts level [13,14,15,16].  Metamodels based on
regression methods have been created relating vehicle
design variables (geometry, engine specifications, drag
polars, etc) to vehicle responses (takeoff gross weight,
thrust-to-weight ratio, etc.).  Further advances in the
methodology added economic variables, requirements
and mission constraints, as well as allowing analysis of
the effect of new technologies.
Characteristics:
-Long simulation timeframe (months)
-Up to global in scope
-Low detail
           Interactions effects-based
           Units & entities aggregated
 Strengths:
-Scope: Wide variety of interactions over time
-Full campaign
 Limitations:
 -Far from real world testing standards
 -Difficult to validate
 -Data collection widely dispersed (multi-service)
 -Reliance on abstraction
Campaign View of the World
Engineering Mission Campaign
Component Sub-system Platform Unit Force








































The cornerstone of these probabilistic methodologies is
Response Surface Methodology (RSM) combined with
Design of Experiments (DOE).  RSM is an efficient,
multivariable approach to system modeling that defines
clear cause-and-effect relationships between design
variables and system responses, and is based on a
statistical approach to building and rapidly assessing
empirical metamodels [17,18].
The RSM methodology, employing a DOE strategy,
creates metamodels of a particular synthesis code by
selecting a subset of all possible combinations of
variables to run which will guarantee orthogonality (i.e.
the independence of the various design variables).
Using regression techniques, the subset of inputs are
related to selected outputs to create an equation that
represents the relationship between inputs and outputs of
the synthesis code.  This technique allows the maximum
amount of information to be gained from the fewest
number of experiment executions, and thus provides
trade study results in a more cost-effective manner.
The first step in the creation of the metamodel is to select
an appropriate Design of Experiments.  This DOE is
expressed as a table of experimental cases, specifying
the values of the variables to be used for each individual
execution of the synthesis code.  These values are
usually normalized to a low, high, or midpoint value of the
variable (represented by a –1, 1, and 0 to aid in the
statistical analysis).  An example DOE table is shown in
Table 1.  Typically, the response is first modeled using a
second order quadratic equation of the form:
R is the desired response term
b0 is the intercept term
bi are regression coefficients for the first order terms
bii are coefficients for the pure quadratic terms
bij are the coefficients for the cross-product terms
xi ,xj are the independent variables
k is the total number of variables considered
 This equation is called a Response Surface Equation
(RSE).  Other forms of the equation may be used (for
example, during a screening test, a first order linear
regression is appropriate).  If the non-linearities of the
problem are not sufficiently captured using this form of
the equation, then transformations of the variables and/or
the responses need to be found which improve the
fidelity/accuracy of the model.
A Response Surface Equation (RSE) is created by
executing multiple runs of the synthesis code, with each
execution using as its inputs the values of the variables
determined by the DOE table.  The resulting responses
of interest for each run are then collected from the output
and added to the table (the blank columns in Table 1).  A
statistical analysis package (in this case, JMP [19])
provides the ability to take this data and perform a
regression analysis to create these polynomial
representations (Analysis of Variance or ANOVA) to
determine these sensitivities, relative importance, fidelity,
etc.  JMP also aids in providing the experimental setup,
as well as facilitating visualization of the results.  There is
one Response Surface Equation created for each
response, and this equation is a function of all input
variables.  The resulting RSEs, thus, are in actuality
metamodels of the synthesis code used in their creation.
The equations represent a quick, accurate way of
determining a response for given values of variables (as
long as these values are within the range of variables for
which the RSE is defined).
Table 1- Example Design of Experiments Table
The Response Surface Methodology is comprised of two
basic steps, facilitated by the program JMP.  The first is
referred to as the effect screening.  It creates a linear
model which is used to determine the sensitivity of a
response to various inputs and to screen out, using a
Pareto analysis, those variables that do not contribute
significantly to the variability of the response.  The
second step is called surface fitting, and yields a
polynomial representation that gives the response as a
function of the most important input parameters.  These
steps are illustrated in Figure 7.
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Experimental Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 …Factor n Response 1 …Response n
Case (R1) (Rn)
1 - - 0 - R1-1 Rn-1
2 - + 0 + R1-2 Rn-2
3 + - 0 0 R1-3 Rn-3
4 + + 0 + R1-4 Rn-4
5 0 - - 0 R1-5 Rn-5
6 0 - + 0 R1-6 Rn-6
7 0 + - - R1-7 Rn-7
8 0 + + - R1-8 Rn-8
9 - 0 - + R1-9 Rn-9
10 + 0 - - R1-10 Rn-10
11 - 0 + 0 R1-11 Rn-11
12 + 0 + - R1-12 Rn-12
… … … … … … …
The benefit of RSM is that it provides an almost
instantaneous evaluation time.  The equations are
portable and can be run in a spreadsheet, a computer
code, or even by hand.  Within the variable ranges given,
the results can be highly accurate.  Caution should be
exercised as to the ranges of applicability of these
equations since they do not, as with all polynomials,
extrapolate well.  If variable values are needed outside
the range of the RSEs generated, a new DOE
experiment should be created and executed.  In addition,
the equations are continuous, and thus cannot account
for discontinuities or higher order effects.
Prediction Profiles - Once the RSEs are created, JMP
can then be used to create prediction profiles.  These
profiles allow the designer to see graphically how the
responses vary with respect to changes in each of the
variables.  Figure 8 shows a sample prediction profile.
The lines in Figure 8 denote the sensitivity of the
response with respect to each variable.  In essence, they
are the partial derivatives of the response with respect to
the variable with all other variables set at a given value.
A flat or barely sloped line indicates that the variable
does not have much impact on that response.
When using the prediction profile tool while in JMP (as
opposed to a hard copy printout of the graph), the
program allows the designer to change the value of the
variables by using a click and drag technique.  Using the
RSEs, the graph is then updated in real time to show the
new values of the responses.  In this way the designer
can manipulate the equations to gain insight into the
problem and also to seek optimal configurations.
Figure 8- Example of a Prediction Profile
K_factors - Once the RSEs have been created, they can
be manipulated in a multitude of ways.  One common
use for the RSEs is to explore the effects of varying the
inputs probabilistically.  For example, this technique
could be used to model a new technology concept.  A
new technology concept is characterized by ambiguity
and uncertainty with regards to its performance, cost, etc.
In order to introduce these uncertainties into the model,
variability must be added to each input variable. This
variability may be modeled by creating a multiplier of a
disciplinarian metric and putting a probability distribution
around it.  By using the RSEs in a Monte Carlo
environment, the effect of this variability can be
quantified.  For example, Figure 9 shows a shape
distribution for the multiplier, or K_factor, associated with
wing weight.  This particular shape distribution would be
appropriate for a technology that is expected to give a
7.5% decrease in wing weight, yet recognizes, through
the use of a skewed distribution, that there is some
chance of achieving either a greater or lesser change in
wing weight.  Other distribution shapes that may be used
include a uniform distribution, used for when each value
is as likely as another value, or a normal distribution
which is used when there is an equal uncertainty around
a particular value.  The K_factor concept is not limited to
modeling technologies, but can be used whenever the
impact of the variability of an input factor is desired.
Figure 9- Notional Shape Function for a Wing Weight
Reduction K_factor
Monte Carlo Simulation - After determining shape
distributions for all of the variables, a Monte Carlo
simulation, utilizing the Crystal Ball [14] software, is
conducted.  Variable values are chosen randomly based
on the distribution given.  The responses are then
calculated through the use of the RSEs.  The results are
probability distributions that indicate the likeliness of
achieving a certain result. Figure 10 shows examples of
the two ways that the probabilistic results can be
presented.  The first is the probability density function
(PDF), which depicts the frequency that a certain value is
observed in the simulation. The second is the integral of
the PDF, called the cumulative distribution function
(CDF), which shows the probability or confidence of
achieving a certain value.  By examining the CDF in
Figure 5, the designer can see that there is about a 10%
chance of achieving a takeoff gross weight of 33,475
pounds or less, but a 100% chance of achieving a takeoff
gross weight of less than 33,850 pounds (find 33,475 on
the horizontal axis, follow it up to where it hits the curve,
and read the corresponding probability from the vertical
axis).
The designer can interpret information from the
probability distributions in a number of ways.  If the
distribution has quite a bit of variability, but some or most
of it fulfills the requirement being examined, this would
suggest that the assumptions, including any technology
-9.00% -8.25% -7.50% -6.75%
K_Wing Weight


























infusions, are viable.  It would be beneficial, therefore, to
invest more resources into the technologies or options
that the assumptions represent.  This addition of
resources could have the effect of narrowing the
uncertainty associated with the technologies or options.
On the other hand, if the distribution indicates that the
probability of meeting the requirement is low, then it
might be more provident to examine other options before
investing money into a technology or decision that might
not be sufficient to solve the problem.  This kind of
system-level investigation can also show how much the
detrimental effects of certain decisions are penalizing the
system.  This information, shared with the disciplinary
experts that engage in the development of the
technologies or assumptions, could be investigated to
see how resources need to be allocated towards
reducing the penalties, as opposed to improving benefits.
Figure 10- Examples of a Probability Density Function and
a Cumulative Probability Function
EXTRAPOLATION TO CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS –
Because of the success of applying probabilistic methods
to aerospace vehicles, it became natural to try and
extrapolate these proven methods from the engineering
level models to campaign level models.  This was done
in an attempt to improve the quality of information
provided to the decision makers discussed in the
introduction.  The RSM and DoE strategy was applied to
the campaign analysis code ITEM [20] using a simplified
air scenario.  This preliminary research identified several
key issues that limited the usefulness of using the
probabilistic methods in their current form [21,22].
Human in the Loop - A major difference between vehicle
level and theater level analysis codes is how the user
interacts with the code.  In a traditional vehicle sizing
code, the user will supply a set of inputs and the code will
iterate on a sizing scheme to converge the vehicle
according to the laws of physics and empirical
relationships.  In ITEM and other similar theater codes,
however, the user becomes an integral part of the
analysis process.  This means that the user periodically
evaluates the effect of his/her decisions and can then
change the parameters (either from that point or change
initial input parameters and rerun the simulation) to
provide improved results.  ITEM was specifically
designed to incorporate the use of human judgement to
make strategic decisions based on the state of the forces
at any given time.  Figure 11 shows a typical analysis
scheme for using a theater level code.
Figure 11- Flowchart for Decision-Making for ITEM [23]
The alternative to having the human in the loop is to use
some sort of embedded rules (expert systems) to make
decisions.  There are some theater level codes that do
this.  The key drawback to this is that the rules have an
inherent lack of flexibility to simulate real operational
plans.  In addition, these rules lack transparency in
assessing cause and effect relationships.  An example of
this drawback in illustrated in the following example.  Say
that an embedded rule system is used to model the
decisions made in a particular scenario.  The results are
summarized as follows: “The analysis shows that there is
an 85% probability that this scenario (with its inputs)
results in the loss of two aircraft carriers in the first four
days of the event.”  What is wrong with this statement?
In the real world, losing two aircraft carriers is so
completely unacceptable that, after the loss of the first
carrier, the decisions (inputs) would be changed in
order to ensure that a second carrier would not be lost.
With embedded rules, unrealistic results such as these
could be modeled and erroneous decisions based upon
these results.
Level of Detail – The next key issue identified by the
preliminary research was that of level of detail.  As
discussed in the military code continuum section,
campaign analysis modeling necessarily includes a
sacrifice of detail.  While one way of accommodating this
lack of detail is to use probabilistic inputs, this in itself has
drawbacks.  It was determined by the research that the
ranges put on the input variables had a tremendous
effect on the outputs.  This is because in the campaign
analysis tool itself, different sub-systems and entities
were themselves modeled at differing detail levels.
Therefore, a 5% change in input variables of one entity
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variable of another, more detailed entity.  This disparity
could falsely skew results.   The issue of detail, or lack
thereof, also impacted the transparency of the campaign
analysis.  It was found in the research that the inputs,
especially after being transformed into probabilistic
inputs, could often not be easily identified in a cause and
effect relationship with the outputs.  It was often difficult
to isolate input interactions.
Fixed Scenarios - Finally, it was found that the campaign
scenario itself had a significant effect on the outputs.
Usually when conducting a campaign analysis, a
particular scenario is specified and used for the
remainder of the analysis.  Given a particular scenario, it
can be fairly straightforward to optimize a technological
and tactical solution.  However, as discussed in the
introduction, today’s world is full of rapidly changing
threats and technologies.  An optimized solution for one
particular scenario may differ dramatically from the
solution to a subtly different scenario.  This lack of
robustness can have significant implications to today’s
decision makers, who need to consider a wide variety of
ever changing threats and technological advances.
SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS APPROACH
After identifying the above issues, it was concluded that
applying the current probabilistic methodologies in their
existing form would not adequately provide the
information that the decision makers needed.  The
proposed solution to the issues involved two key
components: the creation of a linked analysis
environment that itself was fully probabilistic.  This new
formulation involves system of systems concepts and is
currently being implemented as part of the Probabilistic
System of Systems Effectiveness Methodology
(POSSEM) [21,22].
LINKED ANALYSIS ENVIRONMENT – The first issue to
be tackled is the level of detail problem.  It has been
shown that the degree of detail lost at the campaign level
is critically detrimental to the results.  Yet at the same
time, it is acknowledged that creating a campaign level
tool that retains detail down to the sub-system
(engineering) level is impractical and computationally
expensive.  The proposed solution to this dilemma
involves the creation of a linked analysis environment.
The first step in creating such an environment is a clear
identification and understanding of the particular problem
to be explored.  This up front analysis determines what
tools (models) need to be used as well as the pertinent
levels of detail needed.  Once these tools are selected,
they are linked together either computationally or
manually to form a complete analysis path that is robust
in both detail and complexity. In other words, a linked
analysis environment is a mini military code continuum
that is specifically selected/designed to aid in the solution
of a particular problem.  This linked analysis environment
is very similar to the concepts of model abstraction and
software zooming [9,24,25].
Here is an example of a possible linked analysis
environment.  Suppose the problem under consideration
is to gain insight into the effect of a new aircraft radar.
Let’s start at one end of the military code continuum.  An
engineering code that models the physics of the radar
would seem like a good and necessary tool to use.
However, just by itself, this tool could only give
performance data of the radar.  But in order to really
assess the effect of this new radar system, it needs to be
placed in its correct context: the radar needs to assigned
to a platform, and that platform needs to be assessed as
a component in the larger system, the warfighting
environment.  So by itself, this code does not provide the
necessary information, even though the level of detail is
superb.  Moving to the other end of the continuum we
may be tempted to start with a full blown campaign
analysis code.  This would give us information (metrics)
at the needed system level.  However, such a code will
be so “top level” that any inputs for aircraft radar would
be limited to one or two variables at most, if any inputs
exist at all.  What is needed, therefore, is a link between
the two extremes.  The detail of the engineering code is
needed yet the data needs to be assessed at the system
(campaign) level.  It should be noted that a direct link
between the two extremes is not practical, and indeed
violates the military code continuum.  There needs to be
an intermediate code at the mission level.  The radar
needs to be placed on an aircraft and that aircraft needs
to be placed into a one vs. one or few vs. few situation in
order to assess this new system’s performance.  This
data is then passed on to the campaign code.  Because
there is a clear analysis path from the campaign code all
the way back to the radar code, transparency is
enhanced and a proper assessment may be conducted.
The above linked environment sounds good in theory,
and choosing and linking the codes computationally
seems relatively straightforward.  However, this analysis
environment is only the first piece of the total solution.
How this environment is used is important, and is crucial
to the solution of the overall problem.
FULL PROBABILISTIC ENVIRONMENT – Now that the
analysis environment has been created, the role of
probabilistic methods within this environment can be
discussed.
At the engineering level, the traditional RSM and DoE
probabilistic methods will be applied, as discussed
earlier.  Using these methods at this level has shown a
wealth of benefits, primarily allowing the analyst to
assess the effects of new technologies applied at that
level.  In addition, sensitivities to design requirements
can be explored, as well as determining mission
requirements with  their accompanying sensitivities.
Currently, there are no plans to use the extrapolated
probabilistic methods at the mission level.  This is
primarily to simplify the methodology during its formative
stages.  A mission level code will be implemented to
provided the transition from the engineering level code(s)
selected to the campaign analysis code.  It is understood,
however, that once the proof of concept has been
completed, the components of the methodology can be
applied to any level of the continuum, including the
mission level.
Let’s return for a moment to the Human in the Loop
problem discussed earlier, which occurs at the campaign
level in the analysis.  The question now becomes: how
do we apply a probabilistic methodology if we need to
maintain the information provided by having human in the
loop?  There are several possible approaches.  The first
of these is the simplest.  Acknowledge the problem, but
schedule the events and run the cases anyway.  In other
words, ignore the issue and continue.  The unrealistic
solutions and decisions are accepted and identified,
while still gaining insight into the overall problem.  In
addition, care can be taken to try and eliminate
unrealistic decisions through careful scheduling.  If it is
decided that it is important to include the issue, the next
logical step is to use the concept of decision trees to
schedule events, create nodes of key decisions, and
examine all possible results.
The final decision of the authors was that the issue was
important and crucial enough to address, and critical to
the formulation of the new methodology.  In addition to
using decision trees to identify and model key decision
points, the authors will explore the concept of Time-
Dependant Response Surface Equations (TDRSEs).  In
the current methodology, there is a direct input-output
relationship between the design variables and the
response metrics of interest.  A TDRSE would try and
model an input variable that changes during the course
of the analysis.  Instead of the response being a function
of a set of variables, the response would be a function of
a vector of variables.  Each vector would represent the
set of decisions that could be made at each decision
node.  Another advantage of this formulation is that
probability distributions could be applied to each possible
path at each node.  In this way, the human decision
maker can be modeled.  For example, a decision node
may have two identified paths.  A “practical” decision
might have, say, an 80% chance of occurring while a
more “aggressive” decision would only be chosen 20% of
the time.  In this way, one could model the personalities
and decision-making abilities of several different types of
decision makers, but with the ability to assess them in
one modeled environment.
Finally, also at the campaign level, we address the issue
of the scenario.  The most useful solution is a robust
solution.  Yet, as mentioned earlier, the specific scenario
plays a heavy role in determining the outputs.  Robust
solutions can be explored if a probabilistic threat
environment is employed.  In this way, rapidly advancing
technologies can be accounted for, as well as the
changing political climate.  If a tactical or technological
solution is found while incorporating a probabilistic
scenario, then it can be claimed that the solution is
robust.  If, on the other hand a converged solution is not
possible, then the boundaries of the problem can be
properly explored and the results factored into the risk of
developing such a technology or tactical situation.
Figure 12 summarizes the full probabilistic environment
as applied to the linked analysis environment.  The
traditional RSM and DoE methods will be applied at the
engineering level, with the outputs from that level (in CDF
form) becoming the inputs to the mission level.  Because
the inputs are probabilistic, the outputs will also be
probabilistic, but no internal probabilistic manipulations
will occur at this level.  At the campaign level, a
probabilistic threat scenario is incorporated.  Analysis of
this scenario, using decision tree methods, will identify
key decision nodes.  Appropriate shape factors will be
applied to these decision nodes.  The final outputs will be
in the form of system metrics of effectiveness, and are
presented in the CDF format.
Figure 12- Proposed Full Probabilistic Environment
FUTURE WORK
The purpose of this paper was to outline the approach
and identify some of the key issues associated with
applying full probabilistic methods to campaign analysis.
The authors are currently pursuing the application of
these ideas by formulating a system effectiveness
framework called POSSEM.  Once completed, the
framework will be applied to a test case.  This test case
will involve applying survivability concepts to aircraft and
assessing their impact at the theater level.  A fully linked
analysis environment will be developed, and the
probabilistic methods applied.
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